The Oppenheimer Personality

In studying the life of J. Robert Oppenheimer, I found myself involved in a story that read like a great mystery novel. Here was a man who reached great success - highlighted by the achieving of the atomic bomb, and his immediate post-war popularity. Yet, here was a man who also was to suffer a great deal because of his success with the atomic bomb and the popularity and publicity it brought him.

There were many who considered Robert Oppenheimer a brilliant, yet complex man, “a great man gifted with superb intellect, considerable personal charm, and great personal integrity." (Goodchild, 1985)  However, others considered him "… arrogant, calculating and selfish." (Goodchild, 1985)  To these he was “an actor who, however skillfully, was always playing out a role. To them he was incapable of proper emotion and had betrayed not only friends but causes - maybe even his own country - for his ends." (Goodchild, 1985)  Among those who admired Robert Oppenheimer was James Tuck, one of the British scientists who worked at Los Alamos with Oppenheimer during the war; and later worked on the thermonuclear project after World War II. "By the grace of God, the American government got the right man. His function here was not to do penetrating original research but to inspire it.  It required a surpassing knowledge of science and of scientists to sit above warring groups and unify them. A lesser man could not have done it. Scientists are not necessarily cultured, especially in America. Oppenheimer had to be. The people who had been gathered here from so many parts of the world needed a great gentleman to serve under. I think that's why they remember that golden time with enormous emotion." (Davis, 1968) Many of the physicists who worked with Robert Oppenheimer were to share this type of sentiment about him.

Among those who did not admire Robert Oppenheimer was Wendell Latimer, chemistry head at Berkeley, an assistant director at Ernest Lawrence's laboratory.  He felt Oppenheimer “projected an aura or influence by which those around him were oddly affected.” (Davis, 1968)  He even considered General Groves to be "following the Oppenheimer line.  He was so dependent upon his judgement that I think it is reasonable to conclude that many of his ideas were coming from Dr. Oppenheimer. " (Davis, 1968) This idea of an ability to 'sway 'or ‘hypnotize 'people was shared by others; some who were later to be in a position to do damage to Oppenheimer.

Part of the complex nature of the man who was to head up this nation's atomic bomb project can be illustrated by two incidents that occurred while he was at Berkeley. Once when James Franck, a former Oppenheimer professor, asked a question of one of Oppenheimer’s students during a class, Oppenheimer remarked, "Well, I don't intend to deliver any lectures on 'The Fundamental Meaning of Quantum Mechanics, ' but the meaning of that question is that it is a foolish one.” (Goodchild, 1985)

On another occasion the distinguished Japanese scientist, Hideki Yukawa, came to Berkeley, and Oppenheimer asked if he would address his group of postgraduates on his latest discovery, a new particle called a meson. Yukawa had progressed for no longer than a few minutes when Oppenheimer interrupted him and went on to finish his explanation. (Goodchild, 1985)

Both these incidents point out both a strength and a weakness of the Los Alamos head. His bluntness could be biting; yet he was “more adaptive than creative, with a particular facility for essentializing and commenting on the thoughts of other people” (Goodchild, 1985) , as he did during Yukawa's visit. In The Oppenheimer Case, Philip Stern says “Oppie couldn't bear the notion that there was one important idea he didn't know or one field with which he didn't have a pretty intimate acquaintanceship . . . already conversant in seven languages, Oppenheimer added still another -Sanskrit- and read the Bhagavid-gita in it Is original form. " (Stern, 1969)  However, in the area of politics and political affairs, Oppenheimer lacked knowledge, "I was interested in man and his experience, but I had no understanding of the relations of man to his society. “ (Stern, 1969)

As part of Oppenheimer’s political coming-of-age, he became associated with such organizations as the Friends of the Chinese People, Western Council of the Consumer' s Union, American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, and East Bay Local 349 Teacher's Union. In testimony before the Gray Board later he admitted, "I freely indulged in the brand of political folly that was then common highbrow reaction to the menace of Nazism and Fascism." (Alsop, 1954)  His "political folly" also included associations with members of the Communist Party that were to cause him problems that would plague him for the rest of his life.

However, in the Depression years of the 1930's, and even to some extent during the early period of the war, the Communist Party was not viewed by many in the same light that it was later to be viewed. "In 1939, a protest against arms shipments to Japan allied such groups as the American Legion and YMCA with Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (Americans who had fought with the communists in the Spanish Civil War), and American Friends of the Chinese People, later to be cited by the House Un-American Activities Committee as subversive.” (Stern, 1969)

The War Years

With the American entry into the World War II, Robert Oppenheimer appeared to lose interest in the left-wing political association of his immediate pre-war years. The American Communist Party's official position of non-intervention during 1940, after Hitler had signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin, was not a view he shared. Even though Oppenheimer was on the list of people to be imprisoned in case of national emergency, (Else/KTEH, 1980)  Only a few months after Pearl Harbor, Dr. Arthur Holly Compton asked Oppenheimer to recruit and lead a special scientific task force. (Alsop, 1954)  Soon after General Groves became head of the Manhattan Project, he asked him to head the group that eventually was to end up at Los Alamos.  John J. McCloy, representative of Secretary of War Stimson, was to say, "Oppenheimer was the only American physicist fully qualified for the job”. (Alsop, 1954)

At Los Alamos, Oppenheimer’s skills of adapting ideas and focusing the thoughts of the group toward a common goal was to become evident to those scientists who became part of the Project. Physicist A. Llewellyn Hughes said, "It was not by skill in human relations that he kept Los Alamos moving, but by wisdom. We trusted him. He was completely honest in a way that in the long run made him completely vulnerable.” (Davis, 1968) "He worked at physics mainly because he found physics the best way to do philosophy. This undoubtedly had something to do with the magnificent way he led Los Alamos " (Davis, 1968) said Hans Bethe.

“Oppenheimer did not conduct the Mesa's harmonious anarchy by telling other physicists what to do.  His way was, instead to listen and restate so precisely that everyone's ideas seemed by their own motion to find their proper place in the program. Superficially, the process looked like government by committee except that it went on so swiftly.  A physicist would have an idea, tell it to Oppenheimer, be rewarded with instant flashing comprehension, and set to work at once in the warm glow of a star pupil appreciated.  All this usually took place at public meetings.  Should Oppenheimer have appeared to suppress or overlook any significant proposal, morale would have collapsed." (Davis, 1968)

Oppenheimer's leadership also contrasted with that of Lawrence at the Berkeley lab. At the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, a communist cell did exist. Such alleged Communists as David Bohm, Rossi Lomanitz, Max Friedman, and Joseph Weinberg (ex-students of Oppenheimer s), gave information to Steve Nelson, a communist who passed it on to the Soviet embassy” (Davis, 1968) However, Oppenheimer "kept down radical talkativeness, not by suppressing it but by making it unfashionable. Here only would physicists grow restless and drift back to work when a colleague declaimed too wordily that the blind force of nationalism did not deserve so terrible a weapon. " (Davis, 1968)

“Russia in fact put two spies on the Mesa:  brilliant, tormented Klaus Fuchs of the British Mission and loathsome David Greenglass, a machinist who later sent his sister to the electric chair by pretending he had told her secrets of which he in fact had no inkling. But Security ignored these men, perhaps because they could not be connected in any way with Oppenheimer” (Davis, 1968)

Oppenheimer pressed on with work at Los Alamos without allowing himself to be sidetracked. In Lawrence & Oppenheimer, Nuel Pharr Davis speaks of Oppenheimer's singleness of purpose, "At the Tuesday sessions Oppenheimer showed no awareness that his direction of the Mesa was being challenged (by Teller, Alvarez, etc.). Nothing irked him but faulty computations, and even then, he contented himself with suggesting the appropriate correction. " (Davis, 1968)

According to Davis, "What baffled those who opposed Oppenheimer's leadership … was the pacifist attitude of those who were working with Oppenheimer on the bomb, yet their general eagerness to build the bomb. Two simple facts might seem to account for the contradiction: the director was a Jew, and he believed in Ahimsa. Thus, he might unconsciously convince his associates that the bomb was the only form of Ahimsa (gentleness) that one could teach to the builders of Auschwitz and Belsen. " (Davis, 1968)

As the war went on, the original weapon itself went through a name change. In order to keep the bomb under the B-29, it originally was to have been seventeen feet long and two feet wide. "The earliest of the mortal apparitions to haunt the Mesa, it acquired a name, the Thin Man, whose origin no one now at Los Alamos can account for, (the most likely explanation is the Thin Man character played by William Powell in the film series based on a Dashiell Hammett novel) (Davis, 1968) However, Robert Serber's  “idea that the fissionable projectile could be stopped by a tamper instead of being allowed to pass through proved feasible. Together with other suggestions, this permitted the Thin Man to be cut by half its length into a more efficiently vicious Little Boy” (Davis, 1968)  Yet as the name of the weapon itself took on a new name so, too, did the purpose of the weapon evolve from it's original, with the surrender of Germany.

Many of the scientists who worked at Los Alamos had some kind of previous connection with Germany. In fact, it was fear of what Hitler would do if he were to have such a weapon first, that gave purpose to many for the work being done. Convincing them that Japan should be a target for the weapon was something different.

Freeman Dyson, evaluating Oppenheimer 's performance at Los Alamos in the 1980 film, "The Day After Trinity ", said that he had made a 'Faustian Bargain', which he explained:

"The 'Faustian Bargain' is when you sell your soul to the devil in exchange for knowledge and power. . .and this, of course, in a way, is what Oppenheimer did. There's no doubt he made this alliance with the United States government, in the person of General Groves, who gave him undreamed of resources, huge armies of people and as much money as he could spend; in order to create this marvelous weapon. And it was a 'Faustian Bargain' if ever there was one. .and, of course, we are still living with it ever since. Once you sell your soul to the devil, there’s no going back on it” (Oppenheimer, Uncommon Sense, 1984)

Dyson continues: "There's a sort of technical arrogance that overcomes people when they see what they can do with their minds … it was almost inevitable that the bomb would be used.  All the bureaucratic apparatus was in place. The President would have had to be a man of iron will to put a stop to it.” (Else/KTEH, 1980)

This viewpoint seems very close to summing up the mind of Robert Oppenheimer during those war years, perhaps, also under the influence of this train of thought proposed by General Groves after the war, 'It would have come out sooner or later in congressional hearings, if nowhere else, that we could have dropped this thing; and knowing the American political electorate; it would have come out that every mother ' s son - who fought and died after such and such a date - their blood would be on the hands of the President." (Else/KTEH, 1980)Whatever the thinking of Robert Oppenheimer and the physicists after the victory over Germany, the lab at Los Alamos continued at a rapid pace to produce the weapon that was soon to be used against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Post War Years

After World War II, Robert Oppenheimer was probably the most famous scientist in America. From 1945 to 1950 he served on many government panels and committees, and "was sought out for advice at the highest levels of government -- he was even asked to run for public office. (Else/KTEH, 1980) But events that were to foreshadow the changing of the status of Robert Oppenheimer’s future were occurring.

From a short book written in 1946 called, There Will Be No Time : The Revolution in Strategy, Philip Stern, paraphrases the author, William Liscum Borden, "Recollecting the German V-2 rocket, ... the honeymoon of military security' had ended at the moment that 'rockets and atomic bombs made their appearance. . . 'rocket Pearl Harbor' demands amassing 'a whole war's supply of weapons on hand in advance of any fighting'.. . legislation 'authorizing the armed forces to act instantly in case of attack, regardless of whether Congress is in session'.... only one fundamental issue: whether or not the nation will survive." (Stern, 1969)It would be a letter from Borden a few years later that would precipitate the charges that would lead to the revoking of security clearance of Robert Oppenheimer.

In a country that was becoming more security conscious the Navy Department warned "subversives would seek to penetrate the government not only overtly to obtain information, but to foment distrust of American practices, ridicule American standards, and breed discontent, dissatisfaction and disaffection." (Stern, 1969) In this environment, Oppenheimer was suggesting more openness between governments. "If we ever hope to see the world put peacefully together again, it will have to involve, as one of its essential ingredients, an openness with regard to those parts of life which, if held secret, can be a menace to all mankind." (Oppenheimer, Uncommon Sense, 1984) Such suggestions did not sit well with such men as William Liscum Borden and Air Force Chief Scientist, David Griggs, who decided that Oppenheimer was " either confused or pro-Russian” (Alsop, 1954)

The combination of Oppenheimer's position of influence due to his popularity in the immediate post-war period, and the fact that his opinions were not popular in certain quarters convinced those same people that his influence should be curbed. "He is such a brilliant man," according to General Roscoe Charles Wilson of the Air Force, "the fact that he has such command of the English language, has such national prestige, and such power of persuasion, only make me nervous. " (Stern, 1969) But two events, quite probably, led to the eventual withdrawal of security clearance that accomplished the goal determined by those who were detractors of Robert Oppenheimer.

The first, was by Oppenheimer himself, when he publicly humiliated Lewis Strauss by statements he made before a Joint Congressional Committee in 1949. (Stern, 1969)  Oppenheimer's statement belittling Straus’ fear of sharing radioactive isotopes with a foreign country because of secrecy; was an insult that Straus, apparently, did not forget. The second, cited earlier, was the letter from William Liscum Borden.

On November 7, 1953, just before he was to leave Washington for a new lob; Borden placed his doubts about Oppenheimer in a letter that he mailed to J. Edgar Hoover - also mailing a copy to the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy. (Stern, 1969)  This gave Strauss, who was now the Chairman of the AEC, the opportunity of "venting the bitterness of old disputes through the security system of this country.” (Alsop, 1954) Strauss acted swiftly in bringing Robert Oppenheimer before a hearing board. According to Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in We Accuse, 'it was Straus who went to the President without consulting his colleagues.. . .who forbade the hearings to be held in New York, thus effectively preventing distinguished but no longer young, John W. Davis from appearing as Oppenheimer's counsel, who appointed Roger Robb, a man best known as lawyer for Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's chief journalistic incense-swinger, Fulton Lewis, Jr." (Alsop, 1954)

            "Although the majority of witnesses, Nobel Laureates, government advisors; even General Groves, came to Oppenheimer' defense; it was to no avail. The Atomic Energy Commission found Oppenheimer a security risk.  His clearance was never restored. He was never again asked to advise the government of the United States, and never again worked in nuclear energy.” (Else/KTEH, 1980)

Epilogue

Oppenheimer himself suggests, "I think of this as a major accident-much like a train wreck or the collapse of a building. It has no relation or connection with my life. I just happened to be there." (Stern, 1969) Stern, in his book, says, “To some extent, Oppenheimer did just happen to be in the way of external forces that had very little relation to his personal life.” (Stern, 1969)Certainly the early 50's were a difficult time for a man who had the public views of a Robert Oppenheimer. Many men's reputations were ruined by holding viewpoints that were deemed inappropriate by Senator Joseph McCarthy and those who thought like him.

According to Philip Stern, during the McCarthy Era there was "A wave of postwar anxiety and fear of the unorthodox not dissimilar to that which followed World War I. But in the 1950's popular fears were intensified by the emergence of Russia as a hostile power, the revelations of Soviet espionage against Western powers and by the rise of a superlative and fearsome demagogue - Senator Joseph McCarthy." (Stern, 1969)

In this atmosphere, Robert Oppenheimer, a man who "could be infuriatingly condescending to close acquaintances and loyal defenders as to adversaries", (Stern, 1969) found himself placed in the position of defending himself. Defending against adversaries, some of whom had experienced this side of the Oppenheimer personality.

"Oppenheimer was tried on one set of charges; found guilty by Gray and Morgan on another set; and finally convicted by Strauss and the AEC majority on still another set. " (Alsop, 1954)However, as Vannevar Bush said about the circumstances by which Oppenheimer's security clearance was revoked, "it is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man on trial because he held opinions and had the temerity to express them.” (Alsop, 1954)

According to Philip Stern, Oppenheimer's fall from grace was from "the persuasive advocacy of policies considered by certain persons to be disastrous to their country, coupled with grievous personal offenses against the sensibilities of those very same persons.” (Stern, 1969)

How much the ghosts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to the post-war thinking of Robert Oppenheimer is something that I don't know -- surely, in his views on the hydrogen bomb I believe the influence is evidenced. Quite probably, his compassion for mankind, in the end; was one of the things that brought about his downfall. But the historic contributions of Robert Oppenheimer to mankind both as a physicist, and a humanist outweigh the episode that closed his life with such an unpleasant and unfortunate chapter.

Bibliography

Alsop, Joseph and Stewart (1954). We Accuse. New York: Simon and Shuster.

Davis, Nuel Pharr (1968). Lawrence and Oppenheimer. New York: Simon and Shuster.

Else, Jon/KTEH (Director). (1980). The Day After Trinity [Motion Picture].

Goodchild, Peter (1985). J. Robert Oppenheimer: Shatterer of Worlds. New York: Fromm International.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. (1955). Open Mind. New York: Simon and Shuster.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. (1984). Uncommon Sense. Boston: Birkhauser.

Rhodes, R.ichard (1986). The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon and Shuster.

Stern, Phillip M. (1969). The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row.